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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
JOHNP.VINANTI, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20030881-CA 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for murder, a first degree felony. This Court has 
jurisdiction under UTAHGODE ANN. § 78-2a-3 (2)0 (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1(a). Was defendant in custody when he spontaneously asked Officer Mitchell, 
"Did I kill her?" and "God, what have I done?" 
1(b). If defendant was in custody, were his incriminating questions nonetheless 
admissible because they were volunteered, and were not the product of interrogation? 
The trial court's factual findings underlying the denial of a motion to suppress are 
reviewed for clear error and its conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness. State v Galli, 
967 P.2d 930, 933 (Utah 1998). However, because of the variability of the factual settings 
involving whether a statement is the product of a custodial interrogation in violation of Miranda,1 
the trial court's conclusions on this issue are granted "a measure of discretion." See State v Leyw, 
xMiranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
951 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1997) (trial court afforded "measure of discretion" in its legal 
conclusions on whether there was a valid waiver of Miranda rights). 
2. Did the trial court properly rule pretrial that defendant's history of domestic 
violence against Brenda was admissible? 
No standard of review applies; defendant has not provided an adequate record upon 
which to review this issue. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following authority is reproduced in addendum B: 
Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE G\SE 
Charge. Defendant was charged with murder, a first degree felony in violation of UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-5-203 (West 2004), and desecration of a dead human body a third degree 
felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-704 (West 2004). R8. 
Guilty plea and jury conviction. Prior to opening statements on 12 August 2003, 
defendant pled guilty to desecration of a dead human body as charged. R412:17- 22; R290-283. 
Thereafter, a jury convicted defendant of murder as charged. R372. 
Sentence. The trial court imposed consecutive, indeterminate terms of five-years-to-life 
for murder, and zero-to-five years for desecration of a dead human body. R382. 
Notice of appeal. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. R386. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS2 
Justin Lundell visited his mother's (Brenda Lundell) home on three consecutive days in 
the Fall of 2002 only to be told by defendant— Brenda's new husband— that she was out. 
R412:114-124. On the third day, 2 October 2002, Justin knelt to look under the bed on which 
defendant had just been asleep and stated that he was "just checking . . . to make sure 
[defendant] didn't stash her under there." R412:124. Upon lifting the sheets and seeing Brenda's 
"f eet sticking out" from underneath the bed, Justin exclaimed," Oh, my God, she is under here." 
R412:124-125. 
Autopsy. The next day, 3 October 2002, Dr. Edward Leis, Deputy Chief Medical 
Examiner for the Utah Medical Examiner's Office, performed an autopsy on Brenda's corpse. 
R417:98; seeExhJ # 51-52. Dr. Leis' external examination revealed multiple facial bruises and 
abrasions caused by "impact trauma," like "slaps" and "punches," as well as "rubb[ing]" with 
a "somewhat rough surface," like the "ground or carpet[.]" R417:110-112,155. He also found 
two cuts behind each of Brenda's ears, "about a half to three quarters of an inch in size." 
R417:101,108-109. SaeExhJ 6. Dr. Leis noted that the bruises on Brenda's face were 
decomposing faster than her other injuries, due to an "underlying injur/' "that made the 
postmortem change occur more rapidly in her face than elsewhere on her body." R417:100. See 
aIsoK417:99-100,112; Exh. # 15. 
In addition to facial injuries, Dr. Leis saw extensive bruising on Brenda's torso (right 
collar and breast bones, left shoulder, breast, and hip, and pelvis, groin, lower back, and 
2The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. See State v 
Lttheriand 2000 UT 76,12, 12 P.3d 92. 
3 
buttocks), forearms (front and back), wrists, and the backs of her hands.3 R417:100-101, 
105,108. See Exh.# # 7-14. Dr. Leis further found that although the front of Brenda's thighs 
were uninjured, both her shins were bruised. R417:101. Se?Exh.# 14. He also found three 
distinct bruises on the back of her right leg just below the knee. R417:101. 
Of all the bruises he examined, Dr. Leis found bruising on Brenda's groin particularly 
unusual: "[T]hat's an area where we don't see bruising very often. I would saythere would have 
been a blow in some fashion. I can't say with what type of object, but it could have been a fist 
or a stomp in that particular area to produce that type of injury." R417:104. See, eg, Exh.# 14. 
Brenda's bruises varied in color from a "red gray shade, indicating they were inflicted within 
hours of her death, see R417:102, to a "blue or purple color," indicating Brenda had the bruises 
"for a period of time before she died." R417:101-102. "[A]ll of [Brenda's] bruises, however, 
"were less than two days of age" when she died. R417:102. 
Dr. Leis also performed an internal examination, including the "internal organs" of 
Brenda's neck, chest and abdominal cavity. R417:112. He looked for signs of strangulation, but 
found none, nor any other signs of trauma "to any of the structures in those particular areas." 
R417:113. He also looked for signs of "natural disease process," but found none, "except for 
some changes in her liver, most likely due to alcohol use." Id; R417:121. Specifically, Brenda's 
liver was progressing toward alcohol disease: "It wasn't at the most extreme and it wasn't 
healthy." R417:142. 
3Although Brenda's backside was pink this was not a sign of injury, but lividity (the 
settling of blood once the heart stops beating), a normal post-mortem change. R417:105. See, 
eg, Exh. # 13. 
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Dr. Leis' internal examination of Brenda's head, on the other hand, revealed "extensive" 
bruising in "several areas," including her forehead, scalp, temple and brain. R417:113-114. 
Although he found no skull fractures, Dr. Leis found subdural blood on both sides of Brenda's 
brain, and at the base of her brain and skull. R417:114. Subdural blood is liquid and clotted 
blood which would wash lose with water. Id Its presence indicates traumatic injury 
[Something has happened that causes the brain and the skull to move 
independently of each other. As they do[] that[,] blood vessels that stretch in 
between those two structures are stretched and torn, and then they leak blood, 
and it winds up floating freely on the inside of the head. 
Id "[SJubdural bleeding" requires a great deal of force and results from "[a]ny type of action or 
activity that [] cause[s] a sudden acceleration of the head, a blow to the head," "a shaking where 
the head is moving," "or repeatedly pushing or shoving the head into an object might also 
produce that action as well." R417:115. It can be fatal if the "volume of blood" "becomes large 
enough" to "put pressure on the brain[.]" R417:116. Brenda's subdural bleeding, while a 
contributing factor, was not the sole cause of her death. Id 
In addition to subdural blood, Dr. Leis found subarachnoid blood, or blood "on the 
bottomfront of [Brenda's] brain." R417:117. For subarachnoid bleeding to occur, "small blood 
vessels have to be torn and the[n] the blood leak[s] into the membranes." Id This same area was 
also bruised: "[WJhatever force or impacts her head sustained and as her brain was shifting in 
her skull independently of the skull, this brain is sliding over the base of her skull, and it's 
bruising actually causing bruises to her brain tissue as well." R417:118. 
Finally, Dr. Leis's internal exam revealed generalized swelling in Brenda's brain and a 
"large hemorrhage in the tip of her tongue." R417:120. Sa?R417:118-120. Dr. Leis explained 
5 
that the presence of brain swelling, or brain smoothness, meant that Brenda had survived for 
about one half hour after the beating: 
Because Brenda's brain had been damaged and she survived for a period of time, 
her brain responded to that trauma by keeping fluid inside of the brain tissue 
causing it to swell, and so the surface of her brain[, you] can still see the lines, but 
it's fairly smooth because the brain has expanded. 
R417:119. 
The tongue hemorrhage indicated that Brenda had a seizure before she died, which Dr. 
Leis did "not find too sutprising[,J5 in light of her extensive head injuries. R417:120. Given the 
"multitude of injuries, multiple impact sites, bleeding inside her head, bleeding on the surface 
of her brain, and bruising to her brain," Brenda was "most likely5 unconscious during the time 
she survived after the beating. R417:119. It was thus unlikely that Brenda could have crawled 
under the bed where her body was discovered. R417.-125. 
Based on the above, Dr. Leis certified Brenda's death a homicide and concluded that the 
"immediate cause of death [w]as blunt force injuries to the head" which caused her brain to 
swell. R417:120-121. See R417:143-144, 150. Brenda's alcohol level (.17) was not itself fatal, 
but her alcoholism was a contributing factor to her death, causing her to be more susceptible to 
bruising. R417:121-122, 143, 149. Dr. Leis noted that injuries to Brenda's shins could have 
been caused by her stumbling, but that none of her other injuries were consistent with "falling 
down while intoxicated." R417:122. Rather, Brenda's facial and brain injuries resulted from an 
intentional assault or "multiple blows to her face and to her brain." Id; See R417:125-126. 
Moreover, some of the bruises on Brenda's back and arms could be defensive type injuries. 
R417: 154. Although it was impossible to determine exactly how many blows to the head 
6 
Brenda suffered, Dr. Leis opined that there were at least three. R417:123. Dr. Leis also affirmed 
that Brenda's head injuries were consistent with her head being repeatedly and "forcefully 
slammed . . . into the carpet[.]" Id See eg, Exh. # 40. He reiterated that none of Brenda's head 
injuries could have been self-inflicted, "unless she [had] some sort of psychiatric disordei{,]"of 
which there was no evidence. R417:124. From the varying colors of the bruises on Brenda's 
body, Dr. Leis concluded that she had been beaten on at least one previous occasion. Id 
Finally, Dr. Leis concluded that Brenda had been dead for approximately 36 hours before her 
coipse was discovered, or since approximately 7:00 a.m. on 1 October 2002. R417:148. 
According to Dr. Leis, Brenda could possibly have recovered from her injuries, had she been 
taken immediately to the hospital. R417:155-156. 
Defendant's history of domestic violence. Brenda met defendant in November 2001, 
at the Checker Auto Parts store in Spanish Fork, Utah, where he worked. R412:131, 134; 
R413:20.; R416:196. They started a relationship and defendant soon moved in with Brenda. 
R412:133; R413:28-29; R416:208. Defendant and Brenda were together all the time 
and— although they had started having "differences"— they married in June 2002. R412:135; 
seealsoR412:103,137-138; R413:28-29; R416:100,118. 
10 May 2002. Officer Slaymaker of the Spanish Fork Gty Police Department, 
responded to a report of domestic violence at Brenda's home on 10 May 2002. R416:45. Both 
defendant and Brenda were upset and reported that they had been yelling at, and pushing, each 
other. R416:46. They were both intoxicated: defendant's breath alcohol content (BAC) was 
.155, Brenda's BAC was .329. R416:48. Defendant stumbled around, but was coherent and 
7 
communicated appropriately with Officer Slaymaker. R416:53-54. Although both appeared 
uninjured, Brenda was taken to the hospital because of her high BAG R416:49. Officer 
Slaymaker cited both defendant and Brenda for intoxication. Id 
3 June 2002. Officer Slaymaker responded to Brenda's home for a similar incident on 
3 June 2002. R416:50,54. Both defendant and Brenda claimed that the other had pushed them. 
R416:51. Although both appeared intoxicated, Officer Slaymaker did not test their BAG Id 
Defendant communicated calmly with the officer and did not stumble or fall down. R416:52, 
54-55. Officer Slaymaker saw no injuries on either Brenda or defendant and neither of them was 
arrested or cited. R416:52-53. 
ccItold[defendarit] he mis gyvngto endup killingher." 
3 September 2002. Officer Johnson, also of the Spanish Fork Gty Police Department, 
responded to Brenda's home on a report of domestic violence during the early morning hours 
of 3 September 2002. R416:76. He found Brenda naked and lying on the front lavm, still talking 
on her cordless phone to police dispatch. R416:77. Brenda was emotional and intoxicated, but 
said she was uninjured. Id Officer Johnson heard the back door slam and, after looking 
through a chainlink fence, saw defendant run through the backyard and try to cLmb the fence 
enclosing it. Id 
Officer Johnson ordered defendant to stop and he complied. Id Officer Johnson told 
defendant to walk toward him and as defendant did so, the officer saw that defendant was 
having difficulty walking. Id Defendant's speech was also slurred. R416:78. Officer Johnson 
put defendant in handcuffs in the back of his patrol car. Id Although defendant was 
8 
intoxicated— his BAC was .26— he was coherent and declined to tell the officer what had 
happened. R416:79, 91. Brenda said defendant hit her with a closed fist and Officer Johnson 
saw bruising around her left eye and lower left jaw. R416:81. Sa?Exh. # # 1-2,27. She also had 
bruising on her upper right back and left shoulder, and a laceration on her lower left leg. 
R416-.82. See Exh. # # 4, 23, 27. Officer Johnson saw no injuries on defendant. R416-.96. 
Brenda was cited for intoxication and taken to the hospital. R416:92-93. Defendant was 
arrested for domestic violence and intoxication. R416:92. 
On 3 September 2002, prior to contacting police, Brenda ran naked to her neighbors, 
the Jeffses, for help. R416:139. She had sought protection at the Jeffses' home on four prior 
occasions. Id Brenda told Betty Jeffs that the cause of their fighting was defendant's 
dissatisfaction with her sexual performance. R416:144;161-162. Betty's husband, James Jeffs, 
saw Brenda a week prior to this incident: She had a bloody nose and told him that defendant had 
hit her and was drinking again. R416:166-167. Brenda once told James that defendant "beat 
the hell out of her because she didn't give him a blow job right." R416:174. James warned 
defendant "that if he didn't knock this shit off, Qames] was going to thump him . . . t h en . . . . 
I told him he was going to end up killing her." R416:178. 
Brenda's son, Justin, first became aware of the escalating violence between defendant and 
Brenda after the 3 September 2002 incident. R412:104-105. He took the pictures of 
Brenda's injuries in case theylater had to prosecute defendant. R416:105-106. Sa?Exh.## 1-4, 
23-28. Justin and his friend Bryan Olson tried unsuccessfully to kick defendant out of Brenda's 
home. R412:175-176,183; R412:109-110. 
9 
Approximately 10 September 2002. Officer Johnson was called to Brenda's home a 
second time, approximately seven to ten days after the 3 September 2002 incident. R416:96. 
Brenda told the officer that they had a "verbal altercation/' and asked him to escort defendant 
from her home. R416:96-97. Officer Johnson told Brenda that no crime had occurred and 
therefore he could not remove defendant. R416:97. 
Defendant beat Brenda "becavtse she ooddnt do a blow job properly." 
25 September 2002. The Jeffses' daughter, Diana Thomas, visited her parents' home 
on 25 September 2002, and saw Brenda. R416:197. Brenda came over about 7:00 or 8:00 p.m. 
and was upset and crying. Id Her shirt was on inside out and she had a red mark on the side 
of her face. Id; R416:205. Brenda took Diana aside and told her that defendant had just beat 
her in the head. R416:198. Brenda showed Diana her head, but Diana was unable to see any 
obvious injury through Brenda's hair. R416:198. Brenda said defendant beat her "because she 
couldn't do a blow job properly." R416.-199; 5^R416:198-199. Brenda was afraid to call the 
police because she had been drinking and was scared they would take her to jail, R416:199. 
"[S]he wxs afraid for her life[J " 
26 September 2002. Justin last saw Brenda alive on 26 September 2002: "She was very 
scared. She had locked herself in the bedroom. I had to knock on her bedroom door and 
announce that it was me before she would let me in." R416:112; seeR418:l 11-112. Brenda told 
Justin that she was "scared," and he saw that she was "shaking and very, very nervous[]." 
R416:112. Brenda also told Justin that "she was afraid for her life and wanted to get a 
10 
restraining order against [defendant]."7d! However, Brenda declined Justin's help, and told him 
to leave. Id Justin saw defendant "incapacitated on the couch." Id 
"['JGoawzy, Getamtyfromrm Leawm3alone.[']" 
28 September 2002. Brenda's neighbor, Virginia Hansen, saw Brenda with a black eye 
and bloody face on 28 September 2002. R416:110-lll. Virginia happened to look over the 
fence separating the yards of their twin home and saw Brenda and defendant sitting and talking 
in Brenda's yard. Id\ R416:114. She could not hear what they were saying, but thought that 
Brenda seemed "agitated," and saw that her face was bloody around her nose and mouth. 
R416:ll l . The left side of defendant's face was also bloody. Id Virginia had often seen both 
Brenda and defendant when they were intoxicated. R416:119. 
Virginia Hansen's daughter, Sydney Grant, also saw Brenda's bloody face on 28 
September 2002. R416:126-127. She thought both defendant and Brenda looked "hammered." 
R416-.127. Brenda was "telling [defendant] to, [']Go away, Get away from me. Leave me 
alone.[']" R416:128. Brenda also tried pushing defendant away from her. Id 
Brenda Disappears. Justin visited his mother's home again on 30 September 2002. 
R412:113. He arrived mid-afternoon, but found only defendant. Id When Justin asked where 
his mother was, defendant said she was with Justin's grandmother. Id Justin was not suspicious 
of defendant's answer. Id 
"[Do not] go into the mister bedroom " 
Justin went to Brenda's home around 5:00 p.m. the next day, 1 October 2002. R412:114-
115. The front door was locked, which was unusual. R412:115. Justin tried to enter through 
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the garage and found that the door had been chained on the side and would not open all the 
way. Id He was able to open the garage door just enough to "squeeze underneath" it. Id 
When he tried to enter the house through the garage, defendant blocked the door and would not 
let him enter. R412:116. Eventually Justin was able to open the door and said to defendant: "It's 
just me, Justin, not a robber or anybody." Id Defendant acted surprised and said, "Oh, it's 
Justin." Id When Justin asked defendant where Brenda was, he told him "that she might have 
taken off with somebody else." Id Justin waited for Brenda for about a half hour. R412:117. 
During that time, he tried to use the bathroom, but defendant forced himself through the 
master bedroom entrance and told Justin "not to go into the master bedroom." Id, Justin talked 
to defendant for a minute and glanced around the house to see if anything was unusual, but 
"[everything seemed pretty much normal." Id 
Justin returned to Brenda's house the next day, 2 October 2002, around 3:00 or 4:00 p.m. 
R412:117-118. Because the front door was locked, he had to again force his way under the 
garage door. R412:118. He first checked the living room and kitchen before finding defendant 
in the master bedroom, asleep on Brenda's side of the bed. Id Justin woke defendant up and 
asked him what was going on? R412:119. Justin was upset with defendant "[b]ecause [he] knew 
that something was wrong and that [Brenda] should have been there and he [defendant] should 
not have "been there." Id When Justin asked defendant where Brenda was, defendant said she 
had left with a friend. Id Justin called his grandmother and learned that his mother was not 
with her. R412-.120. 
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Defendant also became upset and threatened to call the police and have Justin removed. 
Id Defendant then grabbed the phone and pretended to call the police. Id Justin knew 
defendant was pretending because he (Justin) had earlier unplugged the cordless phone: "I just 
had a gut feeling he was going to try something like that so I took a course of action." Id 
Justin heard defendant say "[c]Hello. I've a got a kid in my house. Can you come get him? 
Thanks, bye.['] That's all he said." R412:121. Defendant acted "[p]retty nervous" after hanging 
up. R412:126. He "got upset and told [Justin] to leave." R412:121. Although upset, Justin 
observed that defendant's speech was clear and that he was not stumbling or walking into things. 
R412-.126. Defendant's breath smelled bad, but he did not smell like alcohol, as he had the day 
before. R412:142, 146. 
"It stunk like sarethirig mis dead " 
Instead of leaving, Justin put some pizza in the microwave, and wrote his mother several 
notes to place throughout the home. Id; R412:121-123. SaeExh. # # 29-31. He wondered if 
Brenda had left because defendant had "scared her off." R412:156. While Justin was writing the 
notes, his friend Bryan arrived. R412:123. Bryan was worried about Brenda and dropped by 
to check on her. R412:182,187. Bryan thought the house smelled like "alcohol. . . and like a 
dead mouse or something was in the house. It stunk like something was dead." R412:197. 
Justin told Bryan that defendant owed him money and they went in the master bedroom "to ask 
[defendant] if he had the money or not." R412:123-124. 
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"I saw her feet sticking CML " 
Defendant was again on Brenda's side of the bed. R412:124. Bryan shook defendant and 
woke him up. R412:124. Justin, who remained at the bottom of the bed "said, sarcastically, [c]Fm 
just checking under the bed to make sure you didn't stash her under there.['J' Id When he lifted 
the sheets, he discovered his mother: "I lifted up the sheets on the bottom of the bed, on the 
end . . . I saw her feet sticking out." Id Justin knew they were his mother's feet because "she 
had a distinct toenail." R416:125. He exclaimed, "Oh my God, she is under here." Id Justin 
told Bryan not to let defendant leave. Id Justin was "faint," "confused[,] and qtiite shocked." 
R412:128. 
Defendant ran past Bryan into the living room. R412:125,196;R413:93. Both Justin and 
Bryan followed him. R412.-125, 193, 196. Bryan blocked the front door and Justin called the 
police. R412-.125. While on the phone, Justin watched defendant guzzle "a half gallon of 
vodka" he had pulled from underneath the couch. Id; R413:93. Defendant drank the vodka like 
it was water. Id; R412:194. Justin thought defendant was trying to overdose on the vodka and 
told Bryan to get it out of his hands. Id; R412:194; R413-.93. 
Justin asked defendant, "What have you done?" R412:128. Defendant "didn't really 
make any remarks. He just sat there and was pretty— that was right after he had downed almost 
a whole half gallon of vodka so he was starting to tremble a little bit and was pretty gone after 
that." Id Defendant also asked for a cigarette several times. R412:197, 212. Other than a 
scratch above his eye, defendant appeared uninjured. R412:129, 197. 
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Police and paramedics arrived shortly thereafter and Justin helped them lift the bed off 
his mother's body. R412:127. Brenda was covered with a blanket: "It was folded up like she 
was in a taco, just folded over her." Id When they pulled the blanket off of her, Brenda was 
naked underneath it. Id Her naked body was covered with bruises "and lacerations on her neck 
and just beat up severely." Id 
Defendant's theory: "I didn't mean for it to happen." Defendant told the jury that 
he had an extensive criminal record, including multiple burglary and drug convictions and one 
aggravated assault conviction, and that he always, until now, had pled guilty to his crimes: "I've 
never denied them. . . . I just pleaded guilty to them." R413:56; See R413:14-20. Defendant 
claimed to be taking responsibility for Brenda's death as well. See, eg, R413:74 (Defendant: 
"People don't just die in their sleep"); R413:115 ("I'm willing to take responsibility for it. That's 
why I'm here. I deserve the responsibility"). Defendant not only admitted killing Brenda, he 
admitted hiding her corpse under the bed, lying to Justin about her whereabouts, and telling 
Officer Mitchell— and his friend Wayne Russell— that he had killed her. Seeeg, R413:81-84,87-
88,94-95,99,127. Defendant claimed, however, that he had not intended to kill Brenda: "What 
happened is terrible, but I didn't mean for it to happen." R413:115. 
"I darit knawhowtopay attention when anger and fists fly." 
According to defendant, he knew Brenda was bleeding as a result of their last fight, but 
he was unaware how seriously he had injured her. R413:112-115, 117. He claimed to have 
noticed only a little bruise above her left eye. R413:74. If he had known how badly he had hurt 
Brenda, defendant claimed that he would have called an ambulance. R413:114. Defendant 
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admitted that he beat Brenda because he was mad at her, see R413.-155, but maintained that he 
"never hit [Brenda] to cause injury.... [He] wouldn't even realize [he] was hitting her probably." 
R413:132-133. Defendant acknowledged hitting Brenda more than once, but declined "to 
speculate" on exactly how many times he punched her. "I mean, I don't know how to pay 
attention when anger and fists fly. I don't know how— all I know how to do is p robably swing 
my fist. I wouldn't pay attention to that." R413:157. Defendant suggested that he failed to 
perceive how viciously he beat Brenda due to his alcoholism. See, eg, R413:33, 39, 54-55,115; 
see also K41SA2 (counsel: "I personally believe alcohol is the chief evil in this case"). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I. Defendant asserts that evidence he (1) asked incriminating questions of Officer 
Mitchell in the hospital, and also (2) nodded affirmatively in response to an incriminating 
question from a jail transport officer, was obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. Defendant 
claims this evidence was thus erroneously admitted. Defendant's claims of error should be 
rejected for several reasons. First, they are inadequately briefed. Second, any error in the 
admission of evidence that he nodded affirmatively in response to an incriminating question 
from the jail transport officer was invited. Third, defendant's spontaneous incriminating 
questions of Officer Mitchell were not the product of custodial interrogation and were thus 
properly admitted. And finally, even if defendant's incriminating questioning of Off icer Mitchell 
was improperly admitted, he suffered no prejudice because his incriminating questions went only 
to the uncontested issue of whether he killed Brenda— as opposed to the sole contested issue 
at trial— whether he intended to kill her. 
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Point II. Defendant also challenges the trial court's admission of his prior acts of 
domestic violence against Brenda. Defendant's challenge should be rejected because it is 
unsupported in the record. This is because the hearing and admissibility ruling were not 
recorded and thus may not be transcribed. In the absence of an adequate record on appeal, this 
Court presumes the correctness of the proceedings below. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
D E F E N D A N T WAS N O T I N CUSTODY W H E N HE 
SPONTANEOUSLY ASKED OFFICER MITCHELL, "DID I KILL 
HER?" AND "GOD, WHAT HAVE I DONE?55; EVEN IF HE WAS I N 
CUSTODY, HOWEVER, HIS INCRIMINATING QUESTIONS ARE 
ADMISSIBLE BECAUSE THEY WERE VOLUNTEERED AND WERE 
NOT THE PRODUCT OF INTERROGATION 
This is not a "whodunnit" case. Defendant admits killing Brenda and claims only 
that— as an alcoholic— he did not intend to do it. See, eg, R413-.33,39, 54-55,115,134; see also 
R418:42. However, evidence that defendant intentionally beat Brenda "to a bloody pulp" is 
overwhelming. R414:135;5a?^oR417:94-168; Exh.## 6-15,51-52,57-58. 
Nevertheless, in Point I of his brief, defendant challenges the admission of evidence 
going solely to the uncontested issue of whether he killed Brenda, including evidence that he (1) 
nodded affirmatively when a jail transport officer allegedly asked if he had killed Brenda, and (2) 
also asked "incriminating questions" of Officer Mitchell in the hospital. Aplt. Br. at 5 (citing 
R415:31). Defendant's claims should be rejected for several reasons. First, they are 
inadequately briefed. Second, any error in the admission of evidence that he nodded 
affirmatively in response to an incriminating question from the jail transport officer was invited. 
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Third, defendant's spontaneous incriminating questions of Officer Mitchell were not the product 
of custodial interrogation and were thus properly admitted. And finally, even if defendant's 
statements were improperly admitted, he could have suffered no prejudice because they went 
to the uncontested issue of whether he killed Brenda— as opposed to the sole contested 
issue— whether he intendedlo kill her. 
A. Defendant's Claims Are Inadequately Briefed. 
Defendant challenges the admission of evidence that he nodded affirmatively when a 
transporting officer asked if he had killed Brenda. See Aplt. Br. at 5. However, defendant's brief 
does not cite to where in the trial record this evidence was admitted. Id Rather, defendant's 
brief cites only to a pretrial evidentiary hearing dealing solely with the different issue of the 
admissibility of "incriminating questions" defendant asked Officer Mitchell at the hospital. See 
Id (citing R415:31). Therefore, defendant's brief entirely fails to show that the evidence he 
challenges on appeal— that he nodded his head affirmatively in response to an incriminating 
question— was even admitted at trial, let alone erroneously admitted. His claim should be 
rejected on that ground. See, eg, Utah R App. P. 24(a)(9), i(j). 
Defendant's challenge to the admission of "incriminating questions" he asked Officer 
Mitchell, see Aplt. Br. at 5 (citing R415:31), is also inadequately brief ed. Defendant never 
specifically identifies the "incriminating questions" he challenges, let alone the point in the 
record where they were admitted at trial. Defendant's failure to ground his claim of error in the 
record is grounds alone to reject his claim. Sa?Utah K App. P. 24(a)(9), Q. 
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B. Defendant Adduced Evidence That He Nodded 
Affirmatively When Asked if He Killed Bnenda; Therefore, 
Any Error in Its Admission Was Invited. 
Although defendant fails to acknowledge as much in brief, he himself adduced the 
evidence at trial that he nodded affirmatively to an incriminating question from a transporting 
officer. See R413:139. Thus, if defendant's claim of error on appeal is not rejected due to 
inadequate briefing, it should be rejected because any error was invited. See State v Pinder^ 2005 
UT15, \ 62-63, P.3d (declining to review claim of instructional error where defendant 
"signaled] by an affirmative act that he had no objection5' to the 'instruction); State v Dunn, 850 
P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993) ("[A] party cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial 
when that party led the trial court into committing the error."); State v Rugbreg, 965 P.2d 518, 
524 (Utah App. 1998) (same). Indeed, the evidence about which defendant complains was 
adduced during counsel's direct examination of defendant: 
COUNSEL: Are those the only conversations you recall 
having with Officer Mitchell? 
DEFENDANT: No. 
COUNSEL: What other conversations do you recall? 
DEFENDANT: I remember him helping me tie a hospital 
gown around me and putting me in a 
wheelchair and putting me in like a truck or 
a Suburban to go to the jail. And I 
remember a little bit later on I asked him 
something about Brenda. And he said, 'Did 
you kill her?3 He said, 'You killed her.3 And I 
just shook my head yes. 
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R413:96 (emphasis added);4 seealso R413:139. Defendant thus "signaled] by an affirmative act 
that he had no objection" to the evidence and his claim of error may not be reviewed. Pinder, 
2005 UT 15, f 62-63. Given this circumstance, only counsel's performance in eliciting the 
incriminating evidence may be relevant here, but defendant does not assert that counsel was 
ineffective. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1220 ("Of course, if counsel's decision in leading the court 
into error falls below the standard of reasonable professional practice, we may find that counsel 
was ineffective"). And, for good reason. Defendant could not overcome the strong 
presumption that counsel "rendered adequate assistance bypersuading the court that there was 
no oonceiwble tactical basis for counsel's actions." State v Clark, 2004 UT 25, \ 6, 89 P.3d 162 
(internal quotations and citations omitted, alteration in original). As argued by the prosecutor 
below, defendant adduced the evidence in an attempt to "convey[]" to the jury "that he's taken 
responsibility from the very beginning of this." R414:125; seealso R418:33 (counsel: "And I 
started off my case by saying [defendant] wants to take responsibility"). 
4Defendant not only adduced the evidence, he likely manufactured it. On rebuttal, 
Officer Hales, who, along with Officer Mitchell, transported defendant to jail, denied asking 
defendant if he had killed Brenda. R414:72-73. Rather, defendant asked Officer Hales "how 
Brenda was," and Officer Hales "just looked him in the eys and said, 'You know exactly how 
she's doing."' Defendant "just looked at [Officer Hales]. Looked [him] straight in the eye," 
and made no "affirmative motions or gestures." R414:72-73. 
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C. Defendant's Spontaneous "Incriminating Questions" Were 
Properly Admitted. 
As noted previously defendant fails to identify the precise "incriminating questions" he 
challenges on appeal, see Part A, supra. However, he moved unsuccessfully to suppress two 
questions he asked Officer Mitchell in the hospital: "Did I kill her?", and "God, what have I 
done?" R415:31-32. The State presumes that it is their admission here that defendant attempts 
to challenge on appeal. See R417:172; Exh. # 58. Assuming defendant's brief is deemed 
adequate, his challenge to the trial court's admissibility ruling lacks merit and should be rejected. 
As explained below, defendant's incriminating questions are admissible here for either of two 
reasons: (1) defendant was not in custody, and (2) even if he was in custody— and had also 
invoked his right to counsel— his questions were spontaneous or volunteered, and were not the 
product of interrogation. 
Proceedings below. Defendant moved to suppress two incriminating questions he 
asked Officer Mitchell in the hospital: "Did I kill her?", and "God, what have I done?" R117-
111; R415:31-32.5 The prosecutor asserted that defendant's incriminating questions were 
admissible because they were not the product of custodial interrogation. R176-155. 
Two separate hearings were held. The first hearing was held on 9 July 2003. SeeR178. 
Apparently, only one minute of the July 9th hearing was held in open court before the parties and 
court adjourned to chambers and spoke off the record; therefore, the hearing is not able to be 
^Defendant also moved to exclude evidence of his prior bad acts. R94-89. The 
prosecutor responded that defendant's prior bad acts were admissible to show his intent, 
identity, and the absence of mistake or accident. R148-144. Defendant's challenge to the 
trial court's ruling admitting the prior bad acts evidence is addressed in Point II, irfra. 
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transcribed. See Letter from Paulette Stagg, Qerk of the Court, to Dana M. Facemyer, counsel 
for appellant, dated 4 November 2004 (a copy is attached in addendum A), l l ie second or 
continued hearing was held on 15 July 2003. R415. The following evidence was adduced 
regarding two incriminating questions defendant asked Officer Mitchell in the hospital: 
Officer Snow was the first officer to arrive at Brenda's home, arriving about the same 
time as an EMT, around 5:00 p.m. R415:6-7. He was met in the driveway by Brenda's son 
Justin, who led him into a bedroom where he saw Brenda's feet sticking out from under a bed. 
R415:7. While Officer Snow and the EMT pulled the bed off Brenda's body, Officer Snow 
heard Justin and defendant arguing in another room. R415:8, 11. Officer Snow noted that 
defendant was slurring his words. R415:ll. About this time, the EMT determined that Brenda 
was dead and Officer Snow declared the area a crime scene. R415:9. 
It was not the first time Officer Snow had been to defendant's and Brenda's house on 
a domestic violence call and he was concerned for his and others' safety. R415-.9-10. 
As Officer Snow instructed everyone to leave the house, he saw defendant sitting on a couch. 
Id Officer Snow asked defendant to stand so that he could be handcuffed. R415:ll. As 
defendant started to stand he fell on the floor and began shaking. Id Without ever cuffing 
defendant, Officer Snow summoned the ambulance crew to assist him. Id Because he was 
familiar with defendant's history of domestic violence, Officer Snow believed defendant to be 
a possible suspect in Brenda's death, but he did not communicate his suspicion to defendant. 
R415-.20-21. 
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Officer Mitchell arrived at defendant's house at approximately 5:35 p.m., as defendant 
was being taken from the house on a stretcher. R415:23. He was assigned to ride to the hospital 
with defendant, in case the ambulance crew should need protection. R415:23,25. He was not 
told that defendant was under arrest or custody, but only that he had had a seizure and that an 
investigation into Brenda's death was beginning. R415:24. Officer Mitchell saw no restraints 
on defendant, other than the restraints on the ambulance gurney, presumably attached by the 
ambulance crew. Id 
Officer Mitchell was in plain clothes, but had a gun that may have been visible to 
defendant when defendant was conscious. R415:26. However, defendant was mostly 
unconscious during the ride to the hospital. R415:27. Upon arriving at the hospital, defendant 
continued to have the occasional seizure and one of the doctors requested that soft restraints 
be placed on defendant's arms and legs. R415:27-28. Officer Mitchell took custody of 
defendant's clothing and remained in his hospital room while tests were run. R415:28. While 
Officer Mitchell was still at the hospital, his sergeant called and instructed him "that the 
investigation was leading toward[ defendant] and that [he] should just maintain a constant watch 
of him or make sure that he was okay and that he was staying there at the hospital." R415:25. 
According to Officer Mitchell, if defendant had wanted to leave the hospital, he would have 
allowed him to do so, "[depending upon what the medical people would advise. If they would 
have told me he was a danger to himself leaving in his condition," the detective affirmed that 
he would not have allowed defendant to leave the hospital. R415:36. 
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After about 40 minutes, defendant asked Officer Mitchell if he wanted to ask him any 
questions. R415:28. Unsure what to do, Officer Mitchell called another officer and was told 
to advise defendant of his Miranda rights before taking his statement. R415:29. Defendant 
continued to have seizures off and on and to ask how Brenda was doing. Id Around 7:30 p.m., 
Officer Mitchell told defendant that he was not under arrest or in police custody and gave him 
a "casual" Miranda warning: 
I explained to him that, I understand that you want to talk to me, and advised him 
that before he talked to me that he had some rights under the Constitution, and 
one of those rights was that he didn't have to talk to me if he didn't want to, and 
the other one was that he had a right to have an attorney if he wanted one. 
R415:29-30.6 
Defendant indicated his understanding of his Miranda rights by asking for an attorney. 
R104. He also asked to have his leg restraints removed and Officer Mitchell said he would 
"have to check with the doctor, cause he put those on okay?" R104. Officer Jvfitchell asked 
defendant who his attorney was: "Who do you want me to call?" Id Defendant said he needed 
to urinate and again asked about Brenda. R103. In the midst of Officer Mitchell again asking 
who defendant would like him to call, defendant interj ected that he did not have a a attorney and 
that he would need to get a "public attorney."7 R103. Thereafter, Officer Mitchell limited 
6lhe "casual" warning was recorded. SeeR106-104 (a copy is attached in addendum 
q. 
specifically, the conversation proceeded as follows: 
OFFICER MITCHELL: YouVe been out of it, Kay. Do you have a, an attorney that I 
can call and and 
DEFENDANT: ?? no, I do not. 
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further questioning to defendant's physical condition, whether he needed a blanket or water, 
"[i]tems such as that." R415:33; see also R102. Defendant said that he needed some cigarettes, 
or alternatively, a Mcorette patch, and the tape recorder was turned off. R102. 
Sometime later defendant said he wanted to talk and the tape recorder was turned on. 
Id When Officer Mitchell asked defendant what it was he wanted to talk about, defendant first 
asked what was going to happen to him, and then ask what had happened to Brenda? Id Officer 
OFFICER MITCHELL: 
DEFENDANT: 
OFFICER MITCHELL: 
DEFENDANT: 
OFFICER MITCHELL: 
DEFENDANT: 
OFFICER MITCHELL: 
DEFENDANT: 
you can, talk, talk to him and, you know, we can get one down 
here so you can talk with me, cause you know when you say you 
want an attorney then, you know, I need to 
Well, you're gonna have to get me a public attorney then. 
not, not answer the questions or not, not ask you a bunch of 
questions. But, you know, I'd like to hear your sss, you know, 
what happened as far as what's going on up to the house and 
stuff. But, uh you don't have an attorney that you can have me 
call or anything? 
No, I don't. 
Okay 
I need you to get me a public attorney. 
A public attorney? 
Yeah. 
OFFICER MITCHELL: Okay. Yeah, I'll, that'll take me some time. I'll have to work on 
that. 
DEFENDANT: Kay 
OFFICER MITCHELL: Okay 
R103-102. 
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Mitchell responded, "I don't know*' to both queries and further indicated that Brenda was 
"probably in the hospital. I don't know what kind of shape she's in. I don't know how bad 
she's hurt." Id Although Officer Mitchell knew Brenda was dead, he "didn't feel like that 
information— that [defendant] needed to know that at that point." R415:36. Defendant then 
asked "how badly" he (defendant) was hurt? R102. Officer Mitchell said defendant appeared 
to be "doin[g] okay," although "you got the strong smell of alcohol on your breath." Id 
Defendant admitted that both he and Brenda had been drinking and further stated that Brenda 
had hid two bottles of vodka and his pistols from him. RIO 1-100. In the midst of defendant's 
story, Officer Mitchell left the room to take a phone call and returned to find def en dant napping. 
R100. Shortly thereafter, the tape recorder was turned off a second time until defendant began 
asking about his cat, Fluffy, and Brenda. Id 
After the tape recorder was turned on, Officer Mitchell said he would check on the cat 
and also try to find out about Brenda. Id Officer Mitchell also asked defendant how he was 
feeling and defendant replied, "Oh, not very good[,]" and also asked about the soft restraints: 
"Why did you do ?? ?? all these handcuffs?" R99. Officer Mitchell explained that the restraints 
were to prevent defendant from hurting "one of the nurses or something.]" Id Defendant 
asked Officer Mitchell to remove the restraints and the officer said he would have to "talkto the 
doctor and see what he says." Id The tape was then turned off a third time, but was turned back 
on when defendant began asking about Brenda, and again complained about the restraints. R99-
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98.8 The tape recorder was shut off for a fourth time until defendant again indicated that he was 
worried about Brenda. R97. 
After the tape recorder was turned on, defendant told Officer Mitchell of a time when 
he and Brenda had fought and then Brenda went outside and fell into a cactus. Id Officer 
Mitchell urged defendant to "sleep some of this off, okay?" R96. The tape recorder was then 
shut off and only briefly turned on a final time when defendant requested water. Id 
At approximately 9:00 p.m., defendant again asked about Brenda's welfare, but his 
questions were not recorded. R415:31-32. Specifically, defendant asked Officer Mitchell if 
Brenda was alive and the officer said that he did not know. R415:31. Defendant then asked: 
"Did I kill her?" Id Defendant seemed coherent to Officer Mitchell, who noted that they had 
conversed about "various things." R415:32. At about 9:25 p.m., defendant asked Officer 
Mitchell if he had learned anything about Brenda and when the officer said that he had not, 
defendant asked:" God, what have I done?" Id Of ficer Mitchell wrote defendant's incriminating 
questions on a paper towel. See R417:171-172; Exh. # 58.9 
Based on the above, and following the parties' arguments, the trial court ruled that 
defendant was not in custody when he asked the above questions. R415:56-57. The trial court 
8Defendant ultimately pulled the restraints off of his arms "a couple of hours into the 
evening so probably around 8 or 8:30 [p.m.]." R415:41. 
9Although the trial evidence cited in R417 was adduced after the pretrial admissibility 
ruling, some appellate courts (Utah has no rule), will consider trial evidence, not to reverse, 
but to affirm a pretrial ruling. See, eg, United States v Muniz, 1 F.3d 1018, 1021-1022 (10th Or. 
1993), cert denied, 510 U.S. 1002 (1993); UmtedStates v Basey, 816 F.2d 980, 983 n.l (5th Or. 
1987); State v Duncan, 879 S.W.2d 749, 751 (Mo. App. 1994). Contra State v Kong, 883 P.2d 
686, 688 (Hawaii App. 1994) (reversal). 
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based its ruling on the facts that the "conversation" occurred in a neutral hospital setting and 
that while defendant was restrained, "those restraints were placed by the hospital," and "were 
placed not to restrain the defendant by an officer but in order to protect the defendant during 
his treatment." Id Further, while Officer Mitchell "was present at the hospital during a [ n ] . . . 
approximate four hour period, the treatment that was being rendered to the defendant was that 
of care and medical treatment. He was not at the hospital to interrogate the defendant." Id 
The trial court further ruled that while defendant was a suspect, he was not then the 
focus of the police investigation, 5a? R415:57, and that there were no indicia of arrest. R415:57-
58. The trial court reiterated that defendant was never handcuffed by police, but was placed in 
soft restraints by hospital personnel for treatment purposes only. R415:58. Although Officer 
Mitchell was armed, he was also in plainclothes and was in and out of defendant's hospital room: 
"Taken together, I don't find the officer's presence something that would be oppressive or 
intimidating or, by his mere presence, coercive to the defendant." Id The trial court thus 
distinguished this situation from one where the suspect is "interrogated in the presence of one 
or more officers in uniform, being cuffed under the presence of multiple police vehicles with 
flashing lights or in the police station where he's restrained in a room." Id 
Finally, the trial court found that the length and form of the encounter was non-coercive 
because defendant was "never accused," and "never officialfyplaced in custodyor under arrest." 
R415:58. Rather, defendant was given Miranda warnings in an abundance of caution. R415:59. 
Although defendant thereafter invoked his right to counsel, the trial court emphasized that any 
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subsequent questioning did not rise to the level of interrogation, but was merely "indicative of 
an officer's concern for the defendant relative to his care." Id 
The trial court was thus "persuaded that the defendant clearly was not in custody during 
the time in which the statements were made." Id And, although there was "no obligation to give 
Miranda rights," that defendant understood and invoked his right to counsel, but then waived 
that right when he initiated conversation with Officer Mitchell by asking the incriminating 
questions at issue here. R415:60. Finally, the trial court reiterated that defendant's questions 
were not coerced, but "were spontaneous in many instances and in others were questions that 
were initiated by the defendant, which would support the conclusion that he waived those rights 
and determined to engage in a conversation with the officer on his own volition." Id 
Analysis. As noted briefly above, defendant's incriminating questions are admissible 
here for one of two reasons: (1) defendant was not in custody when he asked the questions; 
thus, the Miranda warning given was unnecessary, and (2) even assuming defendant was in 
custody, his spontaneous questions were not the product of interrogation and are therefore 
admissible, regardless of the fact that defendant had earlier invoked his right to counsel. 
L Defendant's Incriminating Questions Are Admissible 
Because He Was Not in Custody. 
Whenever an accused is subjected to custodial interrogation, he must be given the benefit 
of a Miranda warning. State v Yoder, 935 P.2d 534, 545 (Utah App. 1997); State v Strausberg, 895 
P.2d 831, 834 n.5 (Utah App. 1995). One is in custody for purposes of Miranda when his 
"freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with a formal arrest." State v Mirquet, 914 
P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah 1996) (additional quotations omitted); Yoder, 935 P.2d at 545. Whether 
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a person who has not been formally arrested is "in custody for Miranda purposes depends on an 
objective assessment of the circumstances of the interrogation with respect to the compulsory 
nature of the interrogation rather than on the subjective intent or suspicions of the officers 
conducting the examination." Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1147. 
The custody determination is aided by review of five factors:" (1) the site of interrogation; 
(2) whether it was communicated to the accused that he was the focus of the investigation; (3) 
whether the objective indicia of arrest were present; [] (4) the length and form of 
interrogation[; ]", id and " (5) whether the defendant came to the place of interrogation freely and 
willingly." State v Gray, 851 P.2d 1217,1224 (Utah App.) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted), cert denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993); see also Salt Lake City v Carner, 664 P.2d 1168, 
1171 (Utah 1983). "[N]o one factor is dispositive." Statev Washington, 970 P.2d 714,716 (Utah 
App. 1998) (quoting Stansbwyv Gdiforrria, 511 U.S. 318, 321 (1994)). 
a* The hospital setting was neutral. 
Applying these factors here, the trial court's ruling, that defendant was not in custody 
when he asked the incrLminating questions in the hospital, is well-supported. ]ndeed, "[t]he 
harm that Miranda was to eradicate was the 'incommunicado interrogation . . . in a police 
dominated atmosphere."5 Statev Dam, 446 N.W.2d 785, 788 (Iowa 1989) (citation omitted). 
The hospital room setting in this case was "substantially less police dominated than that 
surrounding the kinds of interrogation at issue in Miranda itself." State v East, 743 P.2d 1211, 
1212 (Utah 1987) (quoting Berkemerv McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 438-39 (1984) (discussing traffic 
stop scenario)). Defendant was neither isolated nor incommunicado here, but was attended by 
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various hospital personnel who were in and out of his room. See, eg, R411:137; R415:28, 37. 
See Woffordv State, 952 S.W.2d 646,656 (Ark 1997) (hospitalized suspect not in custody where 
hospital personnel were in and out of room); Robinson v State, 602 S.E.2d 574, 576 (Ga. 2004) 
(no custody where defendant had not been released from medical treatment by hospital and was 
not isolated by police for questioning). Cf State v Stott, 794 A2d 120,133 (NJ. 2002) (finding 
custody where hospitalized defendant was questioned "in a secluded basement area... reserved 
solely for police purposes . . . by a total of four law enforcement officers whose status as 
criminal investigators was clear"). While Officer Mitchell accompanied defendant in the 
ambulance and remained with him in the hospital, he was the only officer to do so, and was also 
in plainclothes, never drew his gun, and did not maintain a constant presence in defendant's 
room. S^eg,R100;R411:137;R415:26,31. See Wcffoni, 952 S.W.2d at 655-656 (no custody 
even though three of four officers in suspect's hospital room were uniformed and all wore 
weapons, where none of them restrained suspect or threatened her with weapons, and only 
plainclothes officer asked questions). Cf DeComr^b v State, 433 So.2d 501, 503 (Fla. 1983) 
(hospitalized suspect in custody where interviewed by two deputies with a tape recorder), cert 
denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984). 
Moreover, Officer Mitchell never told defendant that Brenda was dead, let alone that 
defendant was a suspect in her death; rather, he told defendant that he did not know Brenda's 
condition and that defendant was neither under arrest nor in custody. R106. See State v Benson, 
712 P.2d 256,259 (Utah 1985) (no custody where police told defendant he was not under arrest); 
State v Hopfer, 679 N.E.2d 321, 337 (Ohio. App. 1996) (affirmatively noting officers never 
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expressed any intention to arrest); see also Woffbrd, 952 S.W.2d at 656 (fact that hospitalized 
defendant was never told she was a suspect in son's death supported trial court's determination 
she was not in custody. Cf Shedrkk v State, 271 A2d 773, 775-776 (Md. App. 1970) 
(hospitalized suspect in custody where questioned by two detectives and also aware that victim 
might possibly die). 
Given these circumstances, the trial court correctly found that the hospital room setting 
was non-custodial. R415:56-59. This is true even though defendant's feet and hands were 
restrained by hospital personnel for treatment purposes. R104; R415:56. See State v Edwzrds, 
810 A.2d 226, 240 (R.I. 2002) (while "defendant was under restraint," "the restraint was not 
related to a criminal charge, but only to prevent his committing an act harmful to himself"), oert 
denied, 538 U.S. 980 (2003); State v Tuker, 557 A2d 270, 272-273 (N.H. 1989) (only restraint 
imposed on defendant's freedom of movement was due to hospitalization, was not imposed by 
police, and did not constitute custodyf or purpose of Miranda requirements); Wcffbixl, 952 S.W.2d 
at 656-657 (recognizing confinement to a hospital bed is insufficient alone to constitute custody. 
Cf.Rigg v State, 3 S.W.3d 305, 309 (Ark 1999) (suspect in custody where she was under police 
guard, strapped to an ICU bed because she was combative, and also prevented from seeing her 
family. Notably, defendant was allowed to himself remove the arm restraints approximately 
one/half hour to an hour before he asked the incriminating questions at issue here. R415:41. 
b. Defendant was expressly told that he was neither 
under amest nor in custody. 
The trial court also correctly found that while defendant was a suspect, he was not so 
much the focus of the police investigation as to render Miranda warnings necessary R415:57. 
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Indeed, as noted above, no officer told defendant he was a suspect; to the contrary, Officer 
Mitchell expressly informed defendant that he was neither under arrest nor in custody. R106. 
Thus, even assuming police subjectively considered defendant the primary suspect in Brenda's 
death, where such was never communicated to defendant, it is irrelevant. Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 
1148 (law enforcements's unarticulated, subjective focus on a particular suspect is irrelevant to 
custody determination) (citing Stansbwyv Cdifoma, 511 U.S. 318, 323-27 (1994)); Worthington, 
970 P.2d at 717 (same). 
c. N o indicia of arrest. 
The trial court further correctly found that there was no indicia of arrest. R415:57-58. 
Indicia of arrest include "readied handcuffs, locked doors or drawn guns." State v Kelly, 718 
P.2d 385, 391 (Utah 1986) (quotations marks and citation omitted); Strausberg 895 P.2d at 835 
(noting that indicia of arrest include handcuffs, locked doors and drawn weapons). As explained 
above, it is uncontested that the only restraints placed on defendant here were placed by hospital 
personnel for medical purposes only (and that defendant himself removed his arm restraints 
prior to asking the incriminating questions at issue), that Officer Mitchell was in plain clothes, 
never drew his gun or readied his handcuffs, and that defendant's room was open and accessible 
to hospital personnel who were in and out during the approximately four hours at issue here. 
Sa?R415:24-41; R107-96. Moreover, as further noted above, the trial court found that Officer 
Mitchell did not accompany defendant to the hospital with the intent to arrest him. R415:57; see 
also R415:24-25. See eg., Kelly, 718 P.2d at 391 (affirmatively noting officer entered suspect's 
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home with an "investigatory rather than accusatoiy'purpose); Hopfer, 679 N.E.2d at 337 
(affirmatively noting officers never expressed any intention to arrest). 
d. Any post-invocation questioning was limited to 
defendant's well-being. 
Finally while the approximately four-hour encounter was not brief, the trial court 
correctly emphasized that, "[i]n fact, there[ was] little said5' in that time. R415:59. See State v 
Teacher, 883 P.2d 922,930 (Utah App. 1994) (affirming trial court's determination that suspect 
was not in custody during lengthy interrogation which was devoid of coercion and intimidation). 
To the extent there was conversation, it was generally initiated by defendant's inquiries regarding 
either himself, his cat, or Brenda. See Rl02-96. Once defendant invoked his right to counsel, 
the trial court found that Officer Mitchell appropriately lijtnited his questions to matters of 
defendant's comfort and care. R415:59. Thus, this case is "quite different from stationhouse 
interrogation, which frequently is prolonged, and in which the detainee often is aware that 
questioning will continue until he provides his interrogators, the answers they seek." Berkerrer, 
468 U.S. at 438. 
The only arguable exception is the officer's statement— made in the midst of his attempt 
to determine whether defendant had an attorney— that he would "like to hear [defendant's side], 
you know, what happened as far as what's goin[g] on up to the house and stuff." R103. Notably, 
however, this statement generated no incriminating response from defendant who clarified that 
he did not in fact have an attorney and that Officer Mitchell would therefore need to get him 
a "public attorney" Id As set forth above, Officer Mitchell thereafter limited his few questions 
to defendant's well-being. R102-96. The incriminating questions defendant asked Officer 
34 
Mitchell, and which he sought to suppress below, do not occur during the remaining seven pages 
of the transcribed conversation. See R102-96. Rather, defendant spontaneously asks the 
questions at approximately 9:00 p.m. and 9:25 p.m., arguably hours after Officer Mitchell said 
he would like to hear what happened. See R103; R415:29, 31-32. Thus, even assuming the 
officer's statement is reasonably construed as interrogation, nothing came of it.10 
Based on the above, defendant fails to demonstrate any error, let alone clear error, in the 
trial court's determination that defendant was not in custody at the time he asked Officer 
Mitchell if he (defendant) had killed Brenda and what he (defendant) had done. 
2. Defendant's incriminating questions were not the product of 
interrogation, but were spontaneous. 
In any event, the trial court also ruled that defendant's incriminating questions were not 
the product of interrogation, but were spontaneous. R415:60. They are thus admissible 
regardless of whether defendant was in custody, and whether he had previously invoked his right 
to counsel. 
In Miranda v Arizona, the Supreme Court held that "the prosecution may not use 
statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the 
defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the 
privilege against setf-incrimination." 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). Miranda defined "custodial 
10The trial court did not address the fifth factor in its custody determination, "whether 
the defendant came to the place of interrogation freely and willingly." Gray, 851 P.2d at 1224. 
Nor was there a need to do so, given that it is undisputed that defendant was taken to the 
hospital for treatment only. R415:56-57. Notably, defendant does not claim that this factor 
supports his custody claim. Aplt. Br. at 7-10. 
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interrogation" as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been 
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his [or her] freedom of action in any significant 
way." Id 
InRhodelslandv Irms, the Supreme Court further clarified the meaning of "interrogation" 
as "either express questioning or its functional equivalent." 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980). In 
other words, "the term 'interrogation5 under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but 
also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to 
arrest and custody that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response from the suspect." Id at 301. 
Both the Miranda and Irms decisions recognized that not "all statements obtained by the 
police after a person has been taken into custody are to be considered the product of 
interrogation." Irms, 446 U.S. at 299; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478. Rather, "'[interrogation,' as 
conceptualized in the Miranda opinion, must reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond 
that inherent in custody itself." Innis, 446 U.S. at 300. Moreover, "[v]olunteered statements of 
any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by [the 
Miranda decision]." Id (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478). This is true even if the person 
volunteering statements to police has invoked the right to counsel, so long as subsequent 
conversations are initiated by the person rather than police. SeeEdwzrds v A rizona,, 451 U.S. 477, 
484-485 (1981) (once suspect invokes right to counsel interrogation must cease until counsel is 
made available, "unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or 
conversations with the police"). 
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Thus, statements that are not the product of interrogation, but which are volunteered are 
admissible. See, .eg StatevRigg, 1999 UTApp 271,1f 17,987 P.2d 1281 (detective's pre-Miranda 
query whether defendant remembered the accident was not interrogation; therefore, trial court 
did not err in ruling that defendant's incriminating response was not the product of 
interrogation, but was voluntary and spontaneous); State v Dutdne, 969 P.2d 422, 426 (Utah 
1998) (detective's request for background information not interrogation, therefore defendant's 
voluntary and spontaneous statements admissible); State v Hayes, 860 P.2d 968,972 (Utah App. 
1993) (telling defendant that he was under arrest was not interrogation, therefore his 
spontaneous voluntary utterance was not product of interrogation). 
Plainly, an accused's volunteered statements cannot be the product of interrogation in 
the absence of interrogation or its functional equivalent. For example, a defendant's unsolicited 
incriminating chatter to police transporting him to jail are not the product of interrogation where 
officers did not question defendant, but merely agreed with his statements. E.g., State v Yoder, 
935 P.2d 534, 545-46 (Utah App. 1997) (Yoder's statements held voluntary and spontaneous 
where transporting police officer did not "interrogate" him); see also Dutdrie, 969 P.2d at 426 
(Dutchie's statements not the product of interrogation where police merely asked for 
background information and stated words normally attendant to arrest); Hayes, 860 P.2d at 972 
(announcing Hayes was under arrest was not interrogation, therefore Hayes' statements not the 
product of interrogation); McGaimn v Miller, 109 F.3d 1168, 1175 (7th Gr. 1997) (where 
defendant initiated conversation with police, his statements were volunteered and not product 
of interrogation). 
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Based on the above, even if defendant was in custody, and had previously invoked his 
right to counsel, his incriminating questions are still admissible because they were not the 
product of interrogation. See R415:60; see also R104-103. Indeed, once defendant invoked his 
right to counsel, Officer Mitchell limited further questioning to determining defendant's physical 
well-being. See Rl 04-97. To the extent the officer's statement, that he would like to know what 
happened "up at the house," arguably amounted to interrogation, it came in the course of 
determining whether defendant had a particular attorney he wanted to have contacted, and 
elicited no incriminating response. R104-103; saesubpart B, supra. Moreover, approximatelytwo 
hours lapsed from the time defendant invoked his right to counsel around 7:00 or 7:30 p.m., to 
when he spontaneously asked if he had killed Brenda and what he had done, around 9:00 and 
9:30 p.m. R415:28-31; see also R417:172; Exh.# 58. SeePukensv Gibson, 206 R3d 988, 994-995 
(10th Gir. 2000) (holding Pickens reinitiated communication by asking with what he was being 
charged). Nothing in the record reasonably suggests that defendant's incriminating inquiries 
were prompted bywords or actions on the part of Officer Mitchell. See Rl 04-97. Irmisy 446 U.S. 
at 300; M<Gouam> 109 F.3d at 1175. 
Defendant nonetheless asserts that Officer Mitchell "bombarded" him v^vith questions 
after he invoked his right to counsel: "'Do you wanna talk? What [d]o you wanna talk about?'" 
Aplt. Br. at 12 (quoting R102). What defendant omits to acknowledge in his brief, however, is 
that the officer's queries are proceeded in the transcript of their conversation by a notation from 
the transcriber indicating that the tape recorder had just been turned on. See R102. A fair 
reading of the transcript thus reasonably suggests that Of ficer Mitchell's recorded queries were 
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in response to defendant's preceding and unrecorded spontaneous statements, as found by the 
trial court. See R415:60. In ignoring this evidence, defendant fails both to marshal the evidence 
supporting the trial court's ruling, and to demonstrate any clear error in the trial court's findings. 
See West Valley City v Majestic Inu Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991) (setting forth 
marshaling requirement); State v Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 933 (Utah 1998) (appellant's burden to 
demonstrate clear error). His claim can be rejected on either ground. See, eg, State v Bemenuto, 
1999 UT 60, K 13, 983 P.2d 556 (holding that where appellant makes no attempt to marshal 
evidence supporting trial court's ruling, reviewing court "accept[s] the trial court's findings as 
stated in its ruling") ;Gtf//z, 967 P.2d at 933. 
3. Defendant's spontaneous waiver of his previously invoked 
right to counsel was knowing and intelligent. 
Finally, notwithstanding the spontaneous nature of his incriminating questions, defendant 
complains that they should have been suppressed because he was "drunk and incapacitated at 
the time." Aplt. Br. at 14. Defendant posits that given his intoxication, he "could not possibly 
give a 'knowing and intelligent' waiver." Id The trial court disagreed, finding that 
defendant— though intoxicated— was also coherent, and that he demonstrated his understanding 
by invoking his right to a public attorney, and by also thereafter initiating coherent conversation 
with Officer Mitchell. R415:60. SeePidzens, 206 F.3d at 995 (holding Pickens' "initial refusal 
to make a statement and his request for an attorney indicated he 'understood... both the nature 
and consequences of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel'") (quoting Cooks v Ward, 
165 F.3d 1283,1288 (10th Or. 1998)). Defendant fails to demonstrate any clear error in the trial 
court's ruling. 
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Here, although defendant was unconscious and experiencing seizures when he first 
arrived at the hospital, within forty minutes of his arrival he initiated a coherent conversation 
with Officer Mitchell. See R415:28 ("Don't you want to ask me some questions?'5). When 
Officer Mitchell informed defendant of his Miranda rights between 7:00 and 7:30 p.m., 
defendant's speech was appropriate and responsive. R415:32,36; Rl04-102. Defendant further 
demonstrated his understanding by requesting a public attorney, and continuing to initiate 
conversation with Officer Mitchell on various topics ranging from his own condition to that of 
his cat's and Brenda's condition. Rl04-97. This continued over the next two hours, or until 
approximately 9:00-9:30 p.m.,when defendant spontaneously asked if he had killed Brenda, and 
what he had done? R102-97; R415:31-32. According to Officer Mitchell, at the time defendant 
asked these incriminating questions, defendant was "coherent," or "[a]s normal as he was before 
when [they] were talking"earlier. R415:32,36-37. Accordingly, although defendant was 
intoxicated, the trial court's ruling, that he knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights, 
or "determined to engage in a conversation with the officer on his own voHtion," is well-
supported in the record. R415:60. 
Intoxicated defendants like defendant here are generally "unsuccessful in claiming that 
their Miranda waivers should be held invalid because they were [] intoxicated [] at that time." 
WAYNE R LAFAVE, JEROLD H ISRAEL, &NANCYJ. KING, Criminal Procedure, § 6.9(b), p. 584 
& n.33 (2d ed. 1999 & Supp. 2005) (collecting cases). The mere fact that a suspect maybe too 
intoxicated to operate a vehicle does not indicate that he did not know what he was doing when 
he waived his rights. See State v Keith, 628 A.2d 1247,1251 (Vt. 1993). Accordingly, the majority 
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of courts, as did the trial court here, focus on the defendant's behavior at the time of the waiver, 
asking whether the suspect indicated an understanding of his rights and responded coherently 
and appropriately to police. Sa?R415:32; R106-97; see also R415:60. See, eg, Ormev State, 677 
So.2d 258,262 (Fla. 1996) (defendant was "coherent and responsive"), cert denied, 519 U.S. 1079 
(1997); Russdburgv State, 529 N.E.2d 1193, 1195 (Ind. 1988) (alcohol content .2166%, but 
defendant "able to comprehend and respond to questions"); State v Norris, 768 P.2d 296, 334 
(Kan. 1989) (Norris had odor of alcohol, but there was "nothing unusual about [his] speech or 
mannerisms," and he "did not appear to have any trouble responding to [] questions"); State v 
Barczak, 562 A.2d 140,145 (Me. 1989) (although Barczak was under the influence of alcohol, he 
communicated in a "rational manner"). These courts recognize that "it is not in the sense of 
shrewdness that Miranda speaks of intelligent waiver, and thus in this context intelligence is not 
equated with wisdom." WAYNE & LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAELSON, &NANCYJ. KING, Criminal 
Procedure, § 6.9(b), p. 586 (2d ed. 1999 &Supp. 2005) (quoting Cdlins v Brierfy, 492 F.2d 735, 
739 (3d Gr. 1974) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In other words, a Miranda waiver must 
"be knowing and intelligent" only "in the sense that there was awareness of the right to remain 
silent and a decision to forego that right[.]" Id 
Based on the above, the trial court's ruling admitting defendant's incriminating questions 
should be upheld. 
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D. Defendant's Incriminating Questions at the Hospital Went 
to an Uncontested Issue and He Thus Suffered No Prejudice 
in Their Admission. 
As set forth in the Statement of the Facts, at pp. 16-17, supra, defendant's strategy was 
to admit that he killed Brenda, but to contest that he intended the multiple blo^vs he delivered 
to her head to be fatal. Defendant suggested that, due to his chronic inebriation, he was 
unaware of the fatal viciousness of his attack on Brenda. See, eg, R413:33,39,54-55,115; see also 
R418:42. The record is replete with instances of both Brenda's and defendant's heavy drinking, 
see pp. 8-17, supra. However, it is also replete with evidence that he intentionally beat her to 
death, see pp. 4-17, supra. 
The most damaging evidence against defendant is the autopsy result. Dr. Leis found that 
Brenda's fatal brain swelling was caused, not by an accidental fall, but by an intentional assault 
or "multiple blows to her face and to her brain." Id; R417:122-123. Dr. Leis affirmed that 
Brenda's fatal brain injury was consistent with her head being repeatedly and "forcefully 
slammed . . . into the carpet[.]" R417:123. See eg., Exh. # 40. 
The autopsy result, however, is not the only evidence suggesting that defendant acted 
intentionally here. There is also defendant's history of escalating domestic violence against 
Brenda, his hiding of her battered corpse from her son Justin, and his racing from the bedroom 
and swilling of one half gallon of vodka after Justin discovered the corpse. Given all of this 
evidence, and the reasonable inferences therefrom, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury 
would have acquitted defendant, but for the admission of his incriminating questions: "Did I kill 
her?", and "God, what have I done?" Sa?R417:172; Exh. # 58. Indeed, defendant's questions 
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go only to the uncontested issue of whether defendant killed Brenda; they shed little light on 
whether he intended to do so, the sole contested issue at trial. Id; see also R413:115. Defendant 
therefore suffered no prejudice in their admission. See State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 500 (Utah 
1986) (holding defendant was not prejudiced by erroneous limitation on cross-examination 
"because additional cross-examination would not have had a substantial influence in bringing 
about a different verdict").11 
n In light of recent United States Supreme Court precedent, it is unclear whether the 
allegedly erroneous admission of a statement obtained in violation of Miranda amounts to a 
constitutional violation which the State must prove to be harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Compare Dickerson v. United States, 530 
U.S. 428, 438-44 (2000) (holding that Miranda was a constitutional decision which cannot be 
superceded by Congressional action) with New York v. Quarks, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984) 
(indicating that Miranda protections are merely prophylactic and "not themselves rights 
protected by the Constitution" (quotation omitted)). Jurisdictions to have considered the 
issue since Dickerson was issued generally appear to apply the Chapman standard. See, e.g.. 
United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 679 (2nd Cir.) ("Since Miranda's warnings requirement is 
constitutionally based, see Dickerson [], 530 U.S. at 439-40 [], the admission of statements 
obtained in violation of its rule may be deemed harmless only if it appears "beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error . . . did not contribute to the verdict obtained.5" (quoting 
Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24)), cert, denied, 125 S.Ct. 371 (2004); KalisZ v. State, 32 S.W.3d 718, 723 
(Tex. App. 2000) (citing Dickerson and deeming Miranda violation to be constitutional error 
subject to harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard); Lewis v. State, 48 P.3d 1063, 1071 
(Wyo. 2002) (requiring State to prove harmlessness and citing Chapman). However, in United 
States v. Patane, U.S. 124 S.Ct. 2620, 2628-2629 (2004), the Supreme Court held that 
a failure to give Miranda warnings did not require the suppression of physical evidence 
derived from the suspect's unwarned but voluntary statements. The State submits that if the 
fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not apply to violations of Miranda, presumably 
Chapman does not apply either. For all the reasons stated in the body of this point, however, 
even assuming that Chapman does apply, the admission of defendant's incriminating 
questions here—if erroneous—was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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POINT II 
IN T H E ABSENCE OF AN ADEQUATE RECORD FOR REVIEW, 
THIS COURT WILL PRESUME THAT DEFENDANT'S HISTORY OF 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST BRENDA WAS PROPERLY 
ADMITTED 
In Points B-C of his brief, defendant challenges the trial court's admission of his prior 
acts of domestic violence against Brenda. Aplt. Br. at 17-18. Defendant's claim should be 
rejected because he has failed to provide an adequate record for review. 
As noted in Point I (C), at p.21 n. 5, supra, defendant moved pretrial to exclude his prior 
acts of domestic violence against Brenda. R94-89. The prosecutor argued that they were 
admissible to show defendant's intent, identity, and the absence of mistake or accident. R148-
144. Two separate pretrial hearings were held in this case. The first hearing was held on 9 July 
2003. See R178. However, only one minute of the July 9th hearing was held in open court before 
the parties and court adjourned to chambers; the subsequent proceeding was not recorded and 
is thus not able to be transcribed. See Addendum A (Letter from Paulette Staj^ g, Clerk of the 
Court, dated 4 November 2004). The second hearing was held on 15 July 2003, but dealt solely 
with defendant's incriminating questions in the hospital, not his prior acts of domestic violence 
against Brenda. See R415. See also Point 1(C), supra. 
On appeal, defendant cites the irrelevant pretrial evidentiary hearing on the admissibility 
of his incriminating questions discussed in Point I, supra. See Aplt. Br. at 5 (citing R415:31). He 
also cites a discussion held outside the presence of the jury following James Jeffs's testimony. 
See Aplt. Br. at 5,16-17 (citing R416:187). The parties' and the court's discussion only references 
the fact the trial court ruled, pretrial, on the admissibility of defendant's prior acts of domestic 
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violence. See, eg, R416:189. The trial court relied on its pretrial ruling in admitting an additional 
prior act of domestic violence at trial, but did not reiterate or expound on its initial pretrial 
ruling. See R416:192. Therefore, defendant's record citation is not illuminating as to what 
happened at the pretrial hearing, or the findings and conclusions underlying the trial court's 
admissibility ruling. See id 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires an appellant challenging a 
finding or conclusion on appeal to "include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to 
such finding or conclusion." Utah R App. P. 11 (e) (2) (West 2004). "Neither the court nor the 
appellee is obligated to correct appellant's deficiencies in providing the relevant portions of the 
transcript." Id As set forth above, defendant failed to have the hearing and ruling on his motion 
to exclude his prior acts of domestic violence recorded. Because defendant failed to request that 
the 9 July 2003 hearing and ruling on this issue be held in open court or recorded, this Court is 
foreclosed from reviewing his claim of error. See State v Widffenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 
1982) ("When a defendant predicates error to this Court, he has the duty and responsibility of 
supporting such allegation by an adequate record. Absent that record, defendant's assignment 
of error stands as a unilateral allegation with the review court has no power to determine."), cert 
denied, 460 U.S. 1044 (1983), abrvgitedon other pounds, State v Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991. 
Indeed, this Court can only "presume the correctness of the proceedings below." State v Snyder, 
932 P.2d 120,131 (Utah App. 1997). SeealsoState v Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1993); Jolket 
v Cook, 784 P.2d 1148,1150 (Utah 1989), cert denied, 493 U.S. 1033 (1990). As observed by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Wetzd: "'[The review Court] simply cannot rule on a question which 
45 
depends for its existence upon alleged facts unsupported bythe record.'" 868 P.2d at 67 (quoting 
State v Bardk, 714 P.2d 287, 288 (Utah 1986)). 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction for murder should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on^j%April 2005. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
[AN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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West's Utah Court Rules Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (Refs & Annos) 
*iii Title II. Appeals from Judgments and Orders of Trial Courts 
-•RULE 11. THE RECORD ON APPEAL. 
(a) Composition of the record on appeal. The original papers and exhibits filed in the trial court, including the 
presentence report in criminal matters, the transcript of proceedings, if any, the index prepared by the clerk of the 
trial court, and the docket sheet, shall constitute the record on appeal in all cases. A copy of the record certified by 
the clerk of the trial court to conform to the original may be substituted for the original as the record on appeal. 
Only those papers prescribed under paragraph (d) of this rule shall be transmitted to the appellate court. 
(b) Pagination and indexing of record. 
(b)(1) Immediately upon filing of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the trial court shall securely fasten the record in 
a trial court case file, with collation in the following order: 
(b)(1)(A) the index prepared by the clerk; 
(b)(1)(B) the docket sheet; 
(b)(1)(C) all original papers in chronological order; 
(b)(1)(D) all published depositions in chronological order; 
(b)(1)(E) all transcripts prepared for appeal in chronological order; 
(b)(1)(F) a list of all exhibits offered in the proceeding; and 
(b)(1)(G) in criminal cases, the presentence investigation report. 
(b)(2)(A) The clerk shall mark the bottom right corner of every page of the collated index, docket sheet, and all 
original papers as well as the cover page only of all published depositions and the cover page only of each volume 
of transcripts constituting the record with a sequential number using one series of numerals for the entire record. 
(b)(2)(B) If a supplemental record is forwarded to the appellate court, the clerk shall collate the papers, 
depositions, and transcripts of the supplemental record in the same order as the original record and mark the 
bottom right corner of each page of the collated original papers as well as the cover page only of all published 
depositions and the cover page only of each volume of transcripts constituting the supplemental record with a 
sequential number beginning with the number next following the number of the last page of the original record. 
(b)(3) The clerk shall prepare a chronological index of the record. The index shall contain a reference to the date 
on which the paper, deposition or transcript was filed in the trial court and the starting page of the record on which 
the paper, deposition or transcript will be found. 
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(b)(4) Clerks of the trial and appellate courts shall establish rules and procedures for checking out the record after 
pagination for use by the parties in preparing briefs for an appeal or in preparing or briefing a petition for writ of 
certiorari. 
(c) Duty of appellant. After filing the notice of appeal, the appellant, or in the event that more than one appeal is 
taken, each appellant, shall comply with the provisions of paragraphs (d) and (e) of this rule and shall take any 
other action necessary to enable the clerk of the trial court to assemble and transmit the record. A single record 
shall be transmitted. 
(d) Papers on appeal. 
(d)(1) Criminal cases. All of the papers in a criminal case shall be included by the clerk of the trial court as part of 
the record on appeal. 
(d)(2) Civil cases. Unless otherwise directed by the appellate court upon sua sponte motion or motion of a party, 
the clerk of the trial court shall include all of the papers in a civil case as part of the record on appeal. 
(d)(3) Agency cases. Unless otherwise directed by the appellate court upon sua sponte motion or motion of a party, 
the agency shall include all papers in the agency file as part of the record. 
(e) The transcript of proceedings; duty of appellant to order; notice to appellee if partial transcript is 
ordered. 
(e)(1) Request for transcript; time for filing. Within 10 days after filing the notice of appeal, the appellant shall 
request from the court executive a transcript of such parts of the proceedings not already on file as the appellant 
deems necessary. The request shall be in writing and shall state that the transcript is needed for purposes of an 
appeal. Within the same period, a copy shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court and the clerk of the appellate 
court. If the appellant desires a transcript in a compressed format, appellant shall include the request for a 
compressed format within the request for transcript. If no such parts of Ihe proceedings are to be requested, within 
the same period the appellant shall file a certificate to that effect with the clerk of the trial court and a copy with the 
clerk of the appellate court. 
(e)(2) Transcript required of all evidence regarding challenged finding or conclusion. If the appellant intends to 
urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall 
include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion. Neither the court nor the 
appellee is obligated to correct appellant's deficiencies in providing the relevant portions of the transcript. 
(e)(3) Statement of issues; cross-designation by appellee. Unless the entire transcript is to be included, the 
appellant shall, within 10 days after filing the notice of appeal, file a statement of the issues that will be presented 
on appeal and shall serve on the appellee a copy of the request or certificate and a copy of the statement. If the 
appellee deems a transcript of other parts of the proceedings to be necessary, the appellee shall, within 10 days 
after the service of the request or certificate and the statement of the atppellant, file and serve on the appellant a 
designation of additional parts to be included. Unless within 10 days after service of such designation the appellant 
has requested such parts and has so notified the appellee, the appellee may within the following 10 days either 
request the parts or move in the trial court for an order requiring the appellant to do so. 
(f) Agreed statement as the record on appeal. In lieu of the record on appeal as defined in paragraph (a) of this 
rule, the parties may prepare and sign a statement of the case, showing how the issues presented by the appeal arose 
and were decided in the trial court and setting forth only so many of the facts averred and proved or sought to be 
proved as are essential to a decision of the issues presented. If the statement conforms to the truth, it, together with 
such additions as the trial court may consider necessary fully to present the issues raised by the appeal, shall be 
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approved by the trial court. The clerk of the trial court shall transmit the statement to the clerk of the appellate 
court within the time prescribed by Rule 12(b)(2). The clerk of the trial court shall transmit the index of the record 
to the clerk of the appellate court upon approval of the statement by the trial court. 
(g) Statement of evidence or proceedings when no report was made or when transcript is unavailable. If no 
report of the evidence or proceedings at a hearing or trial was made, or if a transcript is unavailable, or if the 
appellant is impecunious and unable to afford a transcript in a civil case, the appellant may prepare a statement of 
the evidence or proceedings from the best available means, including recollection. The statement shall be served 
on the appellee, who may serve objections or propose amendments within 10 days after service. The statement and 
any objections or proposed amendments shall be submitted to the trial court for settlement and approval and, as 
settled and approved, shall be included by the clerk of the trial court in the record on appeal. 
(h) Correction or modification of the record. If any difference arises as to whether the record truly discloses 
what occurred in the trial court, the difference shall be submitted to and settled by that court and the record made to 
conform to the truth. If anything material to either party is omitted from the record by error or accident or is 
misstated, the parties by stipulation, the trial court, or the appellate court, either before or after the record is 
transmitted, may direct that the omission or misstatement be corrected and if necessary that a supplemental record 
be certified and transmitted. The moving party, or the court if it is acting on its own initiative, shall serve on the 
parties a statement of the proposed changes. Within 10 days after service, any party may serve objections to the 
proposed changes. All other questions as to the form and content of the record shall be presented to the appellate 
court. 
[Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994; April 1, 1995; January 1, 1998; April 1, 1998; November 1, 
1999; April 1, 2001; November 1, 2002; November 1, 2004; April 1, 2005.] 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE. 
The rule is amended to make applicable in the Supreme Court a procedure of the Court of Appeals for preparing a 
transcript where the record is maintained by an electronic recording device. The rule is modified slightly from the 
former Court of Appeals rule to make it the appellant's responsibility, not the clerk's responsibility to arrange for 
the preparation of the transcript. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Transcript, certificate that no transcript is required, see Rules App. Proc, Form 6. 
Transcript request, see Rules App. Proc, Form 4. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Administrative Law and Procedure €==>676. 
Appeal and Error €^>493 to 543, 594 to 630, 634 to 658. 
Clerks of Courts € ^ 6 9 . 
Criminal Law €^1086.1 to 1088.20, 1104 to 1128. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 110kl086.1 to 110kl088.20; 110kll04 to 110kll28; 30k493 to 30k543; 
30k594 to 30k630; 30k634 to 30k658; 15Ak676; 79k69. 
C.J.S. Appeal and Error §§ 440 to 457, 476 to 477, 487,491, 502, 505, 507 to 524, 527, 535 to 550. 
C.J.S. Courts § 252. 
C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1688. 
C.J.S. Justices of the Peace § 236. 
C.J.S. Public Administrative Law and Procedure §§ 197, 218 to 219. 
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SPANISH FORK POLICE DEPARTMENT 
INTERVIEW REPORT 
Person Interviewed: 
Date: 
Location of Interview: 
Interviewed By: 
Report ID Number: 
Also present at Interview 
Typed By: 
John Vinarjti 
October 2, 2002 
Mountain View Hospital 
Detective Brad Mitchell 
222494 
Janet Bryan 
For Official Purposes Onfy 
Released By The County Attomsy To 
Craig Bainum NOV 0 1 2002 
Discovery provided by the 
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY to 
Defense Counsel ™N0V 0 1 2002 
Page_L_oLijL 
BM Detective Brad Mitchell 
J V John Vinanti 
BM Well, you said you wanted to talk to me a few minutes ago. 
JV But I just don't know what to say. 
BM Oh. Well, you doin okay? 
JV ?? ?? but I don't know what to say and I didn't know what to do. 
BM Well 
JV How's Brcnda? 
BM Well, I just, we need to talk. 
JV Is she alive? 
BM We need to talk Butuh,um 
JV 1$ she alive? 
BM I don't know. I don't know. I came with you here, 
JV You know I came home and she took all my guns. She ?? ?? ?? ?? 
BM Yeah, you know, before we talk, I just want you to be aware that you're not under 
arrest, okay. You're not in police custody. We're just here checktn you out. 
JV 7? 
BM Making sure, tryin to figure out what's goin on. 
JV She took all my money. 
BM Trying to figure out what's goin on, so, you know, just so you're covered and, 
and, and before we talk, just, you've heard this before, those things about, you 
know, talkin to cops. You don't have to talk to me if you don't want to. You 
know that don't ya? For Official Purjx>ses Onfy 
Released By The County Attorney To 
JV Right Discovery provided by the Craig Bainum
 m 0 1 700? 
UTAH COUNTY ATTOF^TEY to,
 Www„ Mmrvm 0 c , ^ r j , 2002 P& / 
Defense Counsel onML^L? 0 8 2 
PageJL_o£i2l. 
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23 BM Kay. Anduh 
24 JV She took all the money. 
25 BM I don't want you to say anything that, you know* 
26 TV No, I don't what she's done with that, and I know she's been with this Lany guy 
27 however where in the hell he is. 
28 BM Kay. Well, I wanna, like I say, I'd like to ask you some, some questions, but uh 
29 JV I need to spit. 
30 BM You need to spit? 
31 JV Uh-biib. 
32 BM Spit right there. Got it? 
33 JV I got it. 
34 BM Kay. Like I say, I'd like to find out what you can tell mc about what's goin on, 
33 but before I talk to you about that, I want you to know that, you know, you have 
*6 your rights under the constitution that you don't have to talk to me if you don't 
7 want to and that yon have the right to an attorney. 
38 JV ?? ?? ?? ?? 
39 BM And, but like I say, we're tryin to figure out whafs goin on, what was goin on 
40 back at the house. 
4J JV ?? no did, is Brenda still alive? 
42 BM I don't know, John. I don't know. Kay. I came with you, the ambulance is up to 
43 your house. They're with Brenda, kay. 
44 JV Kay. 
45 BM You understand if you start talkin to me, you can stop answering questions or you 
46 can stop at any time. r- ^^ . . _ ^ . 
J For Official Purposes Onfy 
48 BM Kay. Discovery provided by the 
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY to 
Defense Counsel „» NOV 0 1 2 0 t t ™ * » ~ a — " * " * ' 
Page^ p f ) ^ . 
GOGlOo 
49 JV This is what happened. 
50 BM And you have, you have the right to have an attorney. You understand that, don't 
51 ya? 
52 TV Kay, well let's do that Let's get me attorney, 
53 BM Kay. 
54 JV ????betalkin???? 
55 BM Okay. Let's do that 
56 JV ?? 
57 BM Kay. 
58 JV Don't you think that would be best? 
59 BM Well, I can't advise you on that, John. I'm not, like I say, I'm not an attorney. 
60 That's just one of your rights and if that's what you want then that's whal we'll 
61 do. 
«2 JV What was ?7 ?? ?? 
63 BM Let's wait just minute till you get your tests back, okay. They can tell me what's 
64 in your system, what's going on with ya, okay? 
65 JV Kay. ?? would you pull the leg one's off. 
66 BM Are they hurtin ya? 
67 JV Yeah. 
68 BM Kay, I'll have to check with the doctor, cause he put those on okay? 
69 JV Okay. 
70 BM And make sure that that's okay with him. John whose your attorney? Who do 
71 you want me to call? You want me to call one of them and get him down hero 
72 before we talk? 
73 JV ?? go to pee first. Discovery provided by the 
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY to 
Defense Counsel onNQV 0 1 2002 
. J Vlnanli Jmervtcyv, October 2, 20Q2 P% 3 
PageiL_o£l2^ 
For Official Purposes Only 
Released By The County Attorney To 
Craig Bainum NOV 0 1 200Z 0 0 0 1 0 4 
"d BM You can pee any time. You got that catheter in there so you just 
75 JV Tt is? 
76 BM Yep, you can just go ahead and let her go. You're okay. Whose your attorney? I 
77 can call one and get one down here? 
78 JV How's Brenda? 
79 BM IdonHknow. I haven't heard. I haven't heard. I don't know what 
80 TV Can you call and find out7 
81 BM Where, whether they took to uh Provo or, you know* where she's at right now. 
82 JV You have no idea? 
83 BM No idea. No. 
84 JV Shoot dude. Fve been out of it, I don't know. 
85 BM You've been out of it? Kay. Do you have a, an attorney that I can call and and 
JV ?? no, I do no t 
87 BM you can, talk, talk to him and, you know, we can get one down here so you can 
88 talk with me, cause you know when you say you want an attorney then, you know, 
89 I need to 
90 JV Well, you're gonna have to get me a public attorney then. 
91 BM not, not answer the questions or not, not ask you a bunch of questions. But, you 
92 know, I'd like to hear your sss, you know, what happened as far as what's goin on 
93 up to the house and stuff. But, uh you don't have an attorney that you can have 
Por Official Purposes Onfy 
eieased By The County Attorney To 
4 me call or anythi g? 
95 JV No, I don't. 
96 
Craig Bainum NOV 0 1 flffl? 
BM Okay. Discovery provided by the 
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY t o 
97 JV I need you to get me a public attorney. Defense Counse l nnHOV Q 1 ?W 
98 BM A public attorney? P a g e _ ^ o L i j L 
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99 TV Yeah. 
j00 BM Okay. Yeah, HI, that'll take me some time. Til have to work on that 
JO! JV Kay, 
102 BM Okay* 
103 JV ?? that's what Til need. 
104 BM Kay* How you dotn otherwise, okay? 
105 JV I need some cigarettes. 
106 BM You need some cigarettes? Okay, well I don't think: they'll let ya smoke in the 
107 hospital, but we'll see what we can do. Hang in there okay. 
108 JV Can I get a patch or somethin? 
109 BM A Nicorette patch? 
110 JV ?? 
7 BM We'll see if we can get you one of them. We're kind of waiting for a test to come 
>t2 back,kay. 
US {Tape turned off and turned on again) 
114 BM Do you wanna talk? What do you wanna talk about? 
115 JV What^s gonna happen to me? 
116 BM I don't know. I don't know. 
117 JV What happened to Brenda? 
118 BM I don't know, John. I don't, you know, she's probably in the hospital. I don't 
119 know what kind of shape she's in. I don't know how bad she's hurt. 
120 JV How bad am I hurt? 
121 BM Well, I don't know. You're doin okay, I think. I don't see any big marks or 
J22
 bruises or anything on you. I think you just, you got the strong smell of alcohol 
123 on your breath. 
Discovery provided by the 
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY ttf?™™' Www. octohcri 2002 rg.s 
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•24 TV Well, J been drinkin. 
J 25 BM Yeah. 
126 J V I just ?? ?? a bunch of pills. She's been doin a bunch of drinkin. 
127 BM ?? Today? 
123 TV Yeah and yesterday, the day before. T don't know what to do about that. I know 
129 I have 
130 BM You've what? 
13) TV Been drinkin. 
j32 BM Mra-hrom. I can smell it on your breath. Mm-toffl. 
133 TV I haven't been doping though. 
134 BM No pills huh? 
135 JV No. I don't do that. 
•5 BM Okay. Well, so 
137 TV Shoot. Crap. I don't want, I don't want to go ???? ?? 
138 BM Not any of what, John? 
J39 TV What happened ?? ?? is uh we just went to the store. We had bought several 
NO things and uh she had took them and hid em. 
141 BM Took what? Your guns, your pills, or what? 
142 JV No, I didn't have any pills. p°r Official Purposes Only 
r-leased By The County Attornev To 
143 BM Well what did Bren, what did Brenda hide? Craig Bainum
 mJ n 1 
- — . NHV t? i /flfi? 
144 JV Uh, two bottles of ?? Vod, Vodka. ~ . 
Discovery provided by the 
BM Two bottles of Vodka? U T A H COUNTY ATTORNEY to 
Defense Counsel nn^OV Q 1 2002 
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146 TV Uh-huh 
000101 
47 BM Oh. 
—j48 JV And men she took my uh pistols, n 7 / " 
149 BM Mm-hmm. 
150 JV She hid them. 
151 BM Hmm, okay. Hang on. Let me answer this phone call, okay5 and I'll be write back 
152 okay. {Leaves to take phone call andreturns) Howyoudoin? You doin okay? 
j53 You okay, John? Takin a nap? You okay, John? John, are you okay? Are you 
j54 okay, John? 
J 55 {Tape turned off and then turned on again) 
156 BM ?? fluffy cat? 
157 JV Is she okay? 1$ she at home? 
j58 BM Mm-hmm, I think so. I don't know. We'll check ?? Doing okay? 
159 TV Where's Brenda? 
"0 BM I'm tryin to find out They're gonna call me back when tbey know somctliing. 
161 JV ?? 
162 BM Kay. Howyoudoin? You okay? 
163 TV Find out about my cat. 
J64 BM Find out about the cat toos okay. I'll find out about the cat. 
J 65 TV Kay. Just at the house. 
For Official Purposes Only 
J66 BM At your house? Released By The County Attorney To 
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 J V Yeah . Craig Bainum NOVOlfflg 
168 BM Okay Discovery provided by the 
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY to 
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J70 BM What's it's name? P a g e j L _ o L ± 2 s . 
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nl JV Fluffy. 
172 BM Fluffy, huh? 
j 73 JV Yeah. It's got a these extra paws on its toes. 
174 BM Oh, okay. 
/ 75 TV So and I just had her spade and everything. See if you can find out about her. 
176 BM Yeah, J11] find out about Fluffy. I'll make a couple calls and see what I can find 
/ 77 out, kay? How you feelin? 
/ 78 JV Oh> not very good. 
179 BM Not very good? 
ISO JV No. Why did you do ?? ?? all theses handcuffs? 
18/ BM Well, that's so you don't have a seizure or somethin and hurt one of the nurses or 
J82 somethin, they put those on ya. 
J 83 JV ?? Pm not gonna do that 
4 BM Okay. 
185 JV Would you take at least one of em off? 
J86 BM We'll see. I'D talk to the doctor asd see what he says. Kay ?? your feet. You 
187 can move those now, right? 
188 JV Yes. 
J8P BM Alright 
J 90 TV Just not ?? ??. 
J 91 BM Yeah. Hang in there. T11 see what I can find out about Fluffy, okay. 
192 {Tape turned off and then turned on again) 
J93 JV ?? know how Brenda is. 
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BM Kay, Til, like I say, I called em and as soon as tbey know sotnetbin, they'd call me 
back. I don't know, bud, I don't know. Doing okay? 
JV Yeah, I think so. I'm just tired of havin all this 
BM I know5 but 
JV shit on me. 
BM You get goin at it, don't want your arms to come undone. 
JV ?? ?? I'm not gonna do anything, just gonna lay here. 
BM Well, I know you're just gonna lay there, but we don't want you, see that' g, you're 
doin there, that kind of stuff. 
JV What are them guys doin here? 
BM Sccin the doctor. 
JV Yeah, ?? gonna get a ?? 
BM No, I don't think so* What are you doin with that one. You're gonna, you're 
gonna pull that and it's gonna be even tighter. Hang on, hang on, don't get hurt. 
JV I wanna pull it off. ?? 7? I'm not gonna hurt anybody. 
BM Well, I'm not worried about that. I don't want you to hurt yourself either. 
JV ?? ?? 
BM You, are you epileptic, do you have seizures and stuff. 
JV I don't know ?? the time. 
BM Okay. 
JV ?? ?? went and then uh 
BM Yeah, imagine that. Kay, get some sleep John. 
JV Can J please Can I please have some water? 
BM I'll go ask the doctor. 
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2)8 (Tape turns off and back on again) 
219 BM What's goin on? You wanna talk to roe? 
220 JV Yeah. 
221 BM How you feelin? 
222 JV Not very good. 
223 BM Not very good, huh? Why not? Hmm? 
224 JV ?? ?? for about thirty somethin days. I don't know what to do-
225 BM Mmm. 
226 JV I'm worried about Brenda. 
227 BM How come7 
228 JV ?? we got in a bad fight. And then she went outside. She fell ?? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? 
229 The one that ?? ?? ?? What the hell is that called? 
" *o BM I don * t know what you're talkin about John? 
23 J JV Them green things with them sprinkling things on i t 
232 BM Green things with the sprinkly things on em? 
233 JV Yeah. 
234 BM In the front yard of your home? 
235 JV Yeah it's a, see it 's a green thing about this long that I pulled out of the ?? and 
236 brought home for her. And it 's got all them spiked things in i t 
23 7 BM Oh, a prickly pear cactu$? 
238 JV Yeah, a cactus. ^
 m , m 
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242 JV Hahaha She fell in it ???????? That wasn't a good thing. And that's when the 
243 cops found her out there ?? ?? completely naked. T mean just totally bruised ?? 
244 ?? ?? 1 don't know. She must have just hid, you know. The wall on the left side 
245 and the wall on the right side and then she fell into the cactus haha and then had to 
246 pull all that crap out of her. 
247 BM Hrnm. Well, that's not good, is it John? 
248 JV ?? that's what you do when you ?? ?? ?? 
249 BM Yeah, yeah, it's a mess, let's sleep some of this off, okay? 
250 JV Kay* 
25 J BM Alright Want me to turn the light back down? 
252 JV Please. 
253 BM Yeah and get some more rest 
254 (Tape turned off and back on again). 
BM I told you I'd call and find out 1 haven't heard back. 
256 JV Man, I really need that water. 
257 BM Okay. I'll go follow up on the water issue right now. 
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